In this project we investigate experimentally the link between self-control and attitude towards paternalism in a principal-agent framework. We invite our subjects for a free lunch: a burger or a turkey. We verify in a pre-test that the burger is considered (much) more tasty and tempting, while the turkey is seen as healthier. In the experiment proper we observe incentivized choices of four types: what menus (must eat burger; must eat turkey; your choice: burger or turkey) subjects assign to another; how they reward each of these menu choices yet another participant made for them; which of the two dishes they pick on the spot (if given the choice); whether they want to pre-commit to a choice of dish for a future session. Similarly to some recent experimental results we find a significant fraction of subjects willing to self-commit. We also observe non-trivial sets of individuals who reward highly a restricted choice and paternalistically restrict other's choice. Moreover, there is a strong link between these three tendencies, suggesting a common thread underlying the use of commitment devices and paternalistic behavior as well as approval thereof in environments involving temptations. We propose a simple theoretical framework organizing the results.
Introduction
Self-control problems (SCP) represent a significant divergence from standard economic models. They allow for a distinction between what is good for the agent (what she should do) and what she ends up doing (what she wants to do). The should choices, such as learning, working, saving, exercising and dieting, tend to involve immediate costs and larger long-run benefits. The want choices, such as leisure, overspending, overeating, drinking and smoking, offer immediate gratification and often substantial deferred costs. Many people tend to go for the wants more often than they had planned to and more than they agree they should and feel comfortable with. They are also prone to regretting them. As a result they may be willing to restrict their future choices, even at a cost, to the should option (self-commitment). Important consequences for welfare analysis and policy recommendations arise. In particular, whereas in the standard model more choice is always weakly preferable, having some options removed from the menu may be beneficial for an agent experiencing SCP.
If so, various forms of paternalism may be advocated, whereby the "sinful" choices are made less salient, discouraged, punished, or altogether removed from the menu. Interestingly, however, there is very limited evidence that support for paternalism tends to be triggered by SCP and associated with willingness to self-commit. Indeed, but a few studies have tried to identify a link between the two and the results seem mixed. Yet, given that limited rationality and self-control problems continue to be presented as a major factor justifying paternalism, confirming or disproving the association between the attitudes towards choice limitation being imposed by self and others appears important. Indeed, many bans, restrictions and taxes aimed at reducing consumption of certain goods that are adopted in liberal democracies seem to be largely driven by belief in SCP. For example, externalities associated with drinking alcohol are probably smaller in 12 year olds (who less often drive cars or carry guns and knives etc.) than 22 year olds; if the latter are allowed to drink while the former are not, it is chiefly due to (perhaps controversial) belief that 22 year olds can better recognize what is good for them. Likewise, smoking marijuana is illegal in many countries, although its externalities are probably much more benign than those of alcohol or even cigarettes. Typically, those who oppose legalization justify it by mentioning marijuana's addictive potential and harm to the user, not other people (Pew Research Center, 2015) . These individuals thus seem to appreciate that the authorities restrict consumption possibilities, by excluding products that are tempting but possibly harmful.
On the other hand, many temperance movements, such as Poland's Crusade for the Liberation of Man call for voluntary abstinence but not law-enforced restricted access (except for minors). Clearly, the proposition that it matters little whether the set of available options is restricted by self or another cannot be taken for granted; an individual may take pride in self-committing, say, not to drink any alcohol but find it annoying if a nanny state limits access to it. Support for paternalism and specifically for taking some options away from the menu may arise from other considerations and psychological tendencies than SCP. Externalities aside, the belief that the patron may be better informed, the cost of acquiring information, the aversion to choice and the sense of belonging and submission to authority are but a few examples.
Studying menu restrictions imposed by others may also be helpful in distinguishing between the main theoretical frameworks that have been offered to account for self-commitment. The main question is how an individual will react to a restriction. Assuming some minimum reciprocity (which is typically found in most individuals, Fehr and Gächter, 1998), we can infer from such a reaction how she feels about the restriction. If the models of time-inconsistent preferences (Strotz, 1956) are correct, adding a tempting object to the menu may lead to it being chosen by the myopic wanting self, against the individual's long-run interests. If thus a choice restriction is made (synchronically) by another, it probably frustrates the myopic self, so a negative reaction is expected. By contrast, models of costly self-control (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001) propose that even if a temptation is resisted, it may come with a non-trivial psychic cost. Thus, it is desirable that it be removed and a positive reaction to such a restriction is predicted.
One could wonder why this indirect method of inferring attitude towards a choice set would be necessary. The main reason is that if no other player is involved, it is difficult to make a clear distinction between the choice of the menu and the choice from the menu. In fact, why would resisting the temptation to include the "sinful" object in the menu be easier than not picking this object once it is already on the menu? In a typical experimental study, this separation is of temporal nature: the choice of the menu takes place immediately, while the choice from the menu is postponed. In such a case, the models of temporal inconsistency give very similar predictions to the models of costly self-control. Moreover, one may wonder if such a separation (which, for practical reasons often only means a few minutes of waiting) should matter at all.
In this project we run an incentivized experiment with natural stimuli (food) in which we give the same participants the opportunity to self-commit to future consumption, restrict others' choices, as well as react to such restrictions. We find substantial heterogeneity, with non-negligible minorities that restrict own choices, restrict others' choices and reward restrictions imposed on their own choices. Moreover, these three groups largely overlap. These findings are most consistent with the models of costly self-control. As an additional manipulation, we investigate the impact of visceral state (hungry vs. satiated) on willingness to self-commit and find no difference.
Previous literature
SCP were addressed in the empirical economic literature when the so called ''preference reversal'' were observed. The term pertains to the situation, in which a decision maker chooses alternative a over alternative b, but also b over a (say, at the latter date). Since the seminal contribution of Strotz (1955 Strotz ( -1956 ), such observations have been modelled taking preference change as a primitive. In particular, researchers have distinguished between current (period 1) preference (denoted by ≿1) and future (period 2) preference (≿2). Then the ''reversal'' observations were explained by timeinconsistent preferences: these of period 1 self, say a ≻1 b, and these of period 2 self: b ≿2 a. In such a non-rational preference relation, one distinguishes sophisticated from naïve decision makers. Specifically, a sophisticated decision maker anticipates her future change of heart, and is compelled to choose the ''best plan but only among those that would be actually followed'' by her period-2 self. Hence, a sophisticated decision maker will not choose a plan (decision for period 1 and planned for period 2 self) that the period 2 self would like to change. If given a game-theoretic interpretation (Phelps, Pollak, 1968; Peleg, Yaari, 1973) , this plan is analogous to a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the two-stage game between self 1 (planner) and self 2 (doer); but see Caplin and Leahy (2001) . It can be shown that the sophisticated decision maker would like to pre-commit (if possible) to some decision plan, by e.g. investing today to restrict the her own second-period options. Later O'Donoghue, Rabin (1999) also considered the case of a naive decision maker, who optimizes consecutively, unaware of her future preference change.
More recently, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, GP henceforth) and Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini (2001) have rationalized preference reversals in a two-period model involving ≿ preferences defined over menus (subsets) of the decision/consumption sets, from which a consumption choice is subsequently made. Preference reversals obtain if {a} ≻ {a,b}∼{b}, indicating that a decision maker prefers menu {a} over {b}, but if facing a choice of an item from the menu {a,b} would succumb to temptation and choose b. This is similar to implications of the Strotz model, and sometimes referred to as an overwhelming temptation case, as a decision maker always succumbs to temptation. However, GP model also allows for preference ordering {a} ≻ {a,b} ≻ {b}, corresponding to a decision maker that exhibits some self-control. That is, when facing a menu {a,b}, he manages to resist and choose alternative a, but at the same time incurring (self-control) cost associated with foregoing the tempting item b. GP obtain their utility representations result (on the set of menus over lotteries) assuming the so-called, set betweenness axiom. That, is, they require that A ≿ B implies A ≿ A ⋃ B ≿ B, for A,B being any menus. More recently, generalizations of these models have been proposed allowing, among other, for random temptations (Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini 2009; dynamic temptations, Gul and Pesendorfer 2004, Noor 2007 ; and choice-dependent temptation cost, Olszewski, 2011) . More on links between time (in)consistency models (such as Strotz 1956 ) and menu models (such as GP) can be found in (Dekel and Lipman 2012).
More generally, the menu models also allow to rationalize various other preferences, where set betweenness axiom is not satisfied. For example, Kreps (1979) studied preferences for flexibility, which can be represented by {a,b} ≿ {a} and {a,b} ≿ {b}. These could be interpreted as preferences of a decision maker, who is not certain about his future preferences and as a result would not like to pre-commit to any specific choice. By contrast, Sarver (2008) and Kopylov (2012) considered preferences allowing for anticipation of regret or guilt. Using our notation, these can be exemplified by the following preferences ordering: {a} ≿ {b} ≿ {a,b}. In such a case fewer options are preferred, as a decision maker may experience guilt when choosing the tempting item b, or may fell regret if his choice is ex-post inferior. Finally, the standard rational decision maker can be represented by {a,b}∼{a} ≿ {b}, that is, any menu is as good as its best alternative.
Recently, some papers have addressed the question of temptations and costly self-control in a principal-agent framework, which is relevant for our design. These include models of the principal, who chooses the optimal contract to screen naive agents displaying dynamically inconsistent preferences (Eliaz and Spiegler 2006) . Heidhues and Koszegi (2010) model credit markets, in which borrowers have a taste for immediate gratification. Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) characterize the optimal contract design for (partially) naive agents with β−δ preferences; while Esteban and Miyagawa (2006) characterize the optimal menu pricing, when consumers face temptation. Finally, the papers by Gilpatric (2008), Yilmaz (2013) and Woźny (2015) characterize the optimal incentive scheme for naive and sophisticated agents with β−δ or GP preferences.
To sum up and merge these two literatures on temptations and principal-agent incentives, if a tempting object decreases utility of an agent as proposed by GP, having it removed by the principal should make the agent grateful. If the agent displays some positive reciprocity, which is commonly found in experiments, she should be willing to reward such restrictions, even it involves a (sufficiently low) monetary cost. By contrast, agents suffering from dynamic inconsistency may be willing to reward the principal who restricts their future, but not immediate options. Studying choices in a principal-agent setting allows disentangling preferences for menu restriction (done by the others) from possible issues of such menu restriction implementation.
We now turn to the empirical literature on temptation and self-control, see Bitterly (2014) for a more comprehensive overview. Some of these studies focused on the prevalence of self-commitment, typically finding up to one-third of participants willing to utilize such devices (Ashraf et al. 2006 , a field experiment in a Philippine bank; Casari 2009, a lab experiment on intertemporal choice).
As mentioned before, empirically distinguishing between the two main different psychological mechanisms considered in theoretical literature, both of which could drive demand for commitment, is difficult. One successful attempt has been recently made by Toussaert (2014) , who used a partly random allocation of menus, so that she could observe predictions and actual choices of those, who did not want to have a choice in the first place. In line with models of costly self-control, she found that even out of individuals who correctly expected to resist the temptation, many preferred not to face it at all. Very recently, isolated studies started investigating how individuals facing possible temptation react to having their menu restricted by somebody else. Kataria et al. (2014) investigated subjects' reactions to restrictions imposed on their menu of alternative monetary gambles. Overall, they punished such restrictions unless they knew that the gamble failed (hindsight bias).
Most closely related to our approach are studies that investigate both paternalism and selfcommitment. Laboratory subjects of Le Lec and Tarroux (2015) were asked to make a series of binary comparisons between menus (involving one or more websites that could be explored during the session). They did so first for themselves and subsequently -for another participant, knowing his or her preference. The authors found that in the latter task, most subject were willing to offer larger menus, even if this did not improve the utility of the most-preferred item on the menu. By contrast, when choosing for self, they typically preferred having unwanted objects removed from the menu. The study used between-subject design, so little can be said of the correlation between the two types of menu choices. Uhl (2013) paid his subjects for showing up for a session early in the morning. Interestingly, while the proportions of subjects willing to impose a commitment on self and others were similar, there was no correlation between the two tendencies. By contrast, in a survey of Danish students, Pendersen et al. (2014) found some link between self-control and support for strong (such as choice restrictions) but not weak (such as nudges) forms of paternalism.
Finally, as related to our experimental manipulation of hunger, studies found that the more caloric, less healthy want food is more likely to be chosen for future consumption when subjects are currently hungry (Read and Van Leeuwen, 1998 ) but we are not aware of a study on the impact of hunger on demand for commitment.
XXXX Finally, to assess the willingness to reward a restricted choice set by some other subject we refer to the recent models of kindness and reciprocity. Falk and Fischbacher (2006) propose an equilibrium model of reciprocity based on psychological games. They distinguish kindness from reciprocity. Specifically, kindness is a utility or payoff element that measures how kind a person perceives the action by another player. Here it is determined by both: the eventual outcome and perceived intention of another player. Reciprocity, is defined as response to the experienced kindness by altering other player utility or payoff. Next, Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad (2007) departure from the game theoretical explanations and define reciprocal preferences using parameter measuring MRS between own and others wealth. This parameter depend on status and reciprocity, as defined by difference between maximal payoff the player mover can guarantee himself and other, say neutral or benchmark payoff. Hence, the model of Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad gives a simple definition of reciprocal preferences based on actually obtained outcomes scaled by reciprocal parameter, and not on higher order (equilibrium) beliefs. As such in our framework it implies that if agents differentiate their willingness to reward a given choice set then their reciprocity parameter must vary sufficiently between obtained menus.
Pre-test
In order to verify that our intended stimuli were appropriate (that is, that there is room for temptation), we run an online pre-test with 135 individuals registered in the subject pool of the University of Warsaw Experimental Economics Lab (UWEEL). The English transcript is provided in Appendix A. Figure 1 shows that while subjects were roughly equally split between the dishes when choosing for immediate consumption, they strongly preferred Turkey in the long run as well as for a loved one. The differences between the distribution of responses to the "to eat now" question and those for any of the two remaining questions are obviously highly significant. Pre-test participants were also asked to compare the two dishes on several dimensions. Table 1 shows summary statistics and Figure 2 provides distribution of our key variable: "Which dish is more tempting?". Clearly, the Burger is the unhealthy, "sinful", tempting option. 
Design and procedures
The sessions of the experiment proper were conducted at various university buildings in Warsaw, Poland, always at lunch time (broadly speaking). Participants were recruited by posters, flyers, student Facebook groups and e-mails sent out to the subject pool of UWEEL (excluding individuals asked to participate in the pre-test). They were informed they would receive a free lunch and earn a few zloty, provided they fill in a questionnaire.
In the end, 199 individuals took part, of which 52% were male. Mean age was 23.8 years. About 90% were students, of which about three quarters studied economics.
Upon arrival, subjects were invited to inspect the two dishes and read descriptions identical with those used in the pre-test. Photographs thereof were also projected on a screen. Subjects were informed (see Appendix B for complete instructions) that there were three menus: 1. {Burger}, 2. {Turkey} and 3. {Your choice: Burger or Turkey}. The first two will henceforth be referred to as restricted menus. They were asked to choose one of the menus for another participant (to which we shall refer as "choice of menu" by a "menu setter" for a "chooser"). They were also told to reward each of these three choices made for them by yet another subject prior to learning which one she actually chose (strategy method). For this purpose, they were endowed with 5 zloty (ca 1 euro) and told a reward could be anything between 0 and 5 zloty and would be tripled for the recipient. For example, if a reward of 2 zloty was envisioned for menu {Burger} and this menu was indeed given, the chooser would pay 2 zloty out of her endowment of 5 and the menu setter would receive 3*2=6 zloty. The high multiplier was used to encourage non-zero gifts, thereby facilitating comparisons between menus. We will refer to these decisions as "choice of rewards". In total, they could thus earn up to 15+5=20 zloty (when their choice was maximally rewarded while they did not reward at all). They were also asked to predict what they would choose if they had a chance to choose, i.e. received Menu 3 {Your choice: Burger or Turkey}. We call it "prediction of choice". Finally, if they actually received this menu, they were asked to choose Burger or Turkey ("choice from the menu").
Because any subject was matched with their peers coming shortly before or after them, they would typically find out very soon which dish was obtained (that would normally be consumed on the spot) and how much was earned. Subjects were also told that a similar session was likely to take place soon and asked if they wanted to pre-commit to any specific dish. Finally, demographic questions and questions related to dieting habits, drinking and smoking were distributed. Subjects would indicate how much they enjoyed their meal, take their earnings and leave.
Sixteen different version of the questionnaire were used in a 2 (order of dishes) X 2 (order of choices) X 2 (numbers in the example) X 2 (commitment before or after consumption) design. First, some subjects always had the Burger listed first, the others -the Turkey. Second, some subjects started with the choice of menu, the others with the choices of rewards. Third, the un-restricted menu was highly rewarded in an example provided to some subjects and it was poorly rewarded in an example provided to remaining subjects; in any case, subjects were told the specific values in the example were arbitrary and illustrative only. Finally, some subjects were asked if they wanted to commit to consumption at a future session before they ate their lunch and some were asked thereafter. Manipulations on the first three dimensions were of minor importance and were not expected to make a substantial behavioral difference. The last manipulation allowed investigating if willingness to commit and the choice depend on visceral factors such as being hungry vs satiated.
Results

The choice of menu
Overall, two-thirds of subjects let their matched partner choose their own dish (coded as gave choice=1), 20.1% forced them to have the turkey and 12.6% to have a burger. No demographic variables significantly correlated with these choices, except that individuals who reported having voted for the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party were more likely to choose one of the restricted menus (p = .039 in a chi-square test when non-voters are disregarded and p =. 061 when they are included). Analogous results were obtained when the "paternalistic" option restricting menu specifically to Turkey was the focal variable, while there were no significant determinants of the less common case of restricting menu to Burger. Same results showed up, although less significant, when various sets of controls were included in a logistic regression, see Appendix C. These regressions resulted in some mixed effects of self-reported alcohol and cigarette consumption. The finding for PiS is consistent with the idea that supporters of this conservative party are more likely to behave in a paternalistic way.
The choice of rewards
Cumulative distribution of rewards that subjects gave for each of the three possible menu choices made for them is represented in Figure 3 . Substantial heterogeneity can be observed, with intermediate values being most common. On average, subjects rewarded Menu 3 {Your choice: Burger or Turkey} most generously. To concisely represent preference for freedom of choice vs. restriction of choice on individual level, the variable bonus was defined as difference between the reward the subject was willing to give for Menu 3 and the largest of the reward she was willing to give for the restricted menus. For example, if the rewards for menus 1-3 were 3, 4 and 2 respectively, then bonus was equal to minus 2. Given construction of the variable, it should take value of zero assuming each menu is as good as the best item on the menu and reward for the menu is a function of the realized utility of the menu. If the reward is an increasing function of the expected utility of the menu and there is some uncertainty about others' preferences, a positive value of bonus is expected. The distribution is shown in Figure 4 . As it turns out, some subjects rewarded one of the restricted menus higher than Menu 3. The frequencies of all different orderings of the three menus are provided in Appendix C. It shows in particular that there was substantial heterogeneity and that only 15.6% of subjects made no distinctions between menus in their rewards (which typically meant always giving 5 or always giving 0). We now seek to verify who was willing to reward choice (compared to the most-rewarded restricted menu) and who was willing to punish it. Again, there were few predictive demographic variables: not voting (p = .032) and voting for PiS was associated with lower bonus for the freedom of choice, while voting for the liberal Nowoczesna, with higher bonus (p = .034 and p = .050 resp. when non-voters are discarded and p = .143 and p =.011, respectively, when included, all in Mann-Whitney tests). Again, the signs are robust, but not all results are significant when a regression is run. The fact that the pattern is somewhat similar to the previous case is no coincidence, as the tendency to make a paternalistic choice and the tendency to relatively generously reward a paternalistic choice were strongly correlated: among the 65 subjects who made paternalistic choices, mean bonus was −1, while it was .47 among 134 subjects who gave the choice of dish to their matched partners. The difference is strongly significant in a rank-sum test (p < .001). All the tests and regressions can be found in Appendix C
The choice of self-commitment
Our other dimension of interest is willingness to self-commit to a specific dish in the future. Overall, 20.6% of subjects preferred to immediately make a binding choice of the dish to be consumed during the new session. Again, this was associated with abstaining in last parliamentary elections (p = .022) and voting for PiS (p = .019 when non-voters disregarded, p = .002 when included). Not surprisingly in view of these results, there were also strong, negative, links with bonus (p = .019 in a Mann-Whitney test) and with letting the other party choose (p = .004 in a chi-square test), see Appendix C. The logistic regression in the appendix also shows that this link cannot be simply explained by the fact that individuals showing strong preference for one of the dishes were willing to both self-commit (because they knew they would not change their mind) and give another participants a restricted menu (because they thought they knew what would be good for him or her). When we control for strong preference (subjects responding "definitely burger" or "definitely turkey" to the question "Now let's assume that you receive the Menu: {Your choice: Burger or Turkey}. Which of these two are you going to choose?"), the variable gave choice is still a significant predictor of commitment.
Summary of the findings in view of considered theories
A few general observations must be made. First, the predictions of the standard theory, i.e. that no rewards would be given, are not confirmed. In fact, almost all subjects choose at least one non-zero reward. Second, vast majority of subjects do differentiate between menus, giving different rewards, apparently because they like some menu choices better than others. This allows testing our key predictions. We thus observe, third, that a non-trivial fraction of subjects restricts others' as well as own future choices. This is consistent with all main theories allowing for preference reversals associated with self-control issues. Crucially, however, we observe a significant fraction of subjects rewarding a restriction imposed by others. Moreover, this tendency is correlated with selfcommitment and restricting others' options. These findings support theories of costly self-control but not theories of temporal inconsistency.
Discussion and conclusion
This is one of very few experimental studies that permit disentangling predictions of the main theories allowing for preference reversals due to self-control issues. We use naturalistic (yet pretested) stimuli, which might increase external validity of our findings. We observe a non-trivial but plausibly low, comparable to previous studies, fractions of commitments and of paternalistic choices. We are able to tell that our findings are only consistent with theories of costly self-control.
To be sure, several limitations must be acknowledged. First, we cannot be completely sure that more highly rewarded menus are indeed those that subjects were happier with; we must rely on past (admittedly, voluminous) literature providing evidence of prevalence of reciprocal behaviour in this respect. Second, our setting made it difficult to elicit many additional psychological measures from our subjects. This will be done in a follow-up study, as vast majority of subjects reported being interested in coming again to the lab and left their contact details. Third, it may be difficult to distinguish between theories of choice reversals and some general preference for or against freedom of choice. In particular, when commenting upon their choices, quite a few subjects simply said that it is best when everybody can choose for him-or her-self. It cannot be excluded that some subjects had exactly the opposite views. If someone preferred the choice to be restricted per se, not because they perceived any specific temptation, they could restrict their future choice and another's choice, and be fine with their choice being restricted. 2 We believe that such pure anti-freedom preferences are very rare, particularly in the European culture. Finally and related to this, it must be noted that some subjects restricted their own or others' choices to Burger, presumably the tempting choice, which may be consistent with the letter but not the spirit of costly self-control models. On the other hand, from the pre-test we know that a (small) fraction of subjects pointed at turkey as the more tempting option.
On the whole however, we believe our study represents a useful step towards empirically uncovering the link between paternalistic choices and self-control problems. In particular, it shows that naturalistic stimuli can be conveniently combined with stringent laboratory control, possibly the optimal design choice for the study of temptation. If the main finding, favouring models of costly selfcontrol, is confirmed in future research, important implications follow. Consider, for example, restrictions on advertisements of alcohol which are in force in many countries. Overall, there appears to be no evidence that they reduce total consumption (Nelson, 2010) . Instead, one brand or one type of alcohol is substituted with another. It would seem therefore that advertising bans are hardly justifiable. However, to the extent that observing ads of alcoholic beverages increases the cost of exerting (ultimately successful) self-control, there could be substantial welfare effects even if total alcohol consumption is not changed.
DESCRPTION OF THE DISHES
Beef burger with barbecue sauce, roasted potatoes with herbs, salad Description: this dish is based on products which provide necessary energy. Here is the nutritious grilled beef Burger spiced with herbs served with traditional American barbecue sauce. A satiating and filling meal, it is a real temptation for any connoisseur. Description: this dish was created by dieticians for a good balance of proteins and carbohydrates. Fat was only used in small amounts, to prepare that meal. The dish was prepared with the use of grilling, steaming and roasting. A great option for people who want to keep fit and stay in shape.
Turkey with pineapple curry, bulgur and steamed vegetables
Which one would you rather have if both were offered for the same, reasonable price? definitely dish no. 1/rather dish no. 1/hard to say/rather dish no. 2/definitely dish no. 2 //none of them If you were to decide on your diet for the next year, would you rather like to see more dishes similar to dish no. 1 (burger) or similar to dish no. 2 (turkey) there?
[definitely similar to dish no. 1 …]
If you had a teenage child, which dish would you rather order for him or her?
[definitely dish no. 
